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The Changes in Mainland Chinese Families
During the Social Transition: A Critical Analysis
AnqiXu'
YanXia"

INTRODUCTION

Modernization theory offers possible explanations for family changes related to advances in
science ana -technology, and socio-economic development in industrial societies.
Modernization impacts family structure, relationship, values and beliefs. Families become
nuclear while people become mobile and the society becomes urban. Economic
development provides employment opportunities outside the birthplace. Away from kinship
network, a nuclear family is less influenced and controlled by elder members in the extended
family in fulfilling its traditional roles and obligations (Parsons, 1943). The changes occur in
all societies although they may vary in pace across societies (Goode, 1982). Modernization
theory is criticized for valuing Western practices and ignoring other cultural and nonwestern experiences (Brugger &Hanna, 1983) and is challenged for the linear causal
relationship posited between industrialization and social changes (Hareven, 1976; 2001). In
spite of the criticism, widely accepted is its proposition that nuclear families increase with
industrialization and urbanization. Such an increase of nuclear families has been observed in
China during its current socio-economic transition (Hu, 2004; Peng & Mao, 1994; Wang,
2007).
China has seen a rapid urbanization and industrialization, and economic development since
its economic reform started in 1978, first in rural and then urban areas. Chinese per capita
GDPhadgrown 14.7 times by 2010, with at least 6% annual rate and double digits in 8 out of
22 years (NBSC, 2011). Family incomes have increased and living conditions have
improved while the gap grows between the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural, and the
coastal and the inland. China has lifted 600 million people out of poverty in the last three
decades (World Bank, 2012). Around the same time, the Chinese government began to
implement One Child Family Policy. Meanwhile, Chinese families have undergone
noticeable changes in structure and relationship. While traditional extended families exist,
there occur various forms of Chinese families, i.e., nuclear families, single-parent families,
families with double income and no kid (DINKs), single person households and cohabitant
households. Some scholars predict that China will follow in the footsteps of family
modernization in Western industrial societies. They believe Chinese marriage and family
. Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Sociology Institute, 7/622 Huaihai Zhonglu, Shanghai, P.R., China
(xaq@sass.org.cn) .
.. University of Nebraska-Lincoln Child, Youth and Family Studies, 254 Mabel Lee Hall, Lincoln, NE 68588-0236,
USA(rxia2@unl.edu}.

©Journal of Comparative Family Studies
Volume XLV Number 1 Winter 2014

32

Journal o/Comparative Family Studies

have declined in importance. These changes are viewed as the weakening of family
functioning (Wu & Li, 2012; Yue & Yuan, 2008), filial piety and familial collectivism, and
growing emphasis on individualism and potential crisis in elderly care (Li, 2011; Meng,
2008; Sun, 2008; Wang, 2008).
Although families around the world bear many similarities in values, strengths and
challenge, they all have unique characteristics shaped by their historical, cultural, social and
economic context. For example, in China, individualism had been and is still seen, to a great
extent, as the bad influences from the West. Pursuing personal interests is viewed negatively
as selfish, irresponsible and demonstrating lack of control. This belief is being challenged
during Chinese social, economic transition. The changes in the social and economic context
have impacted beliefs about marriage and family, and family life practice, e.g., living
arrangements and care of children and elderly. One ofthe many changes is abolishing the old
pension system. Urban parents who expected to receive pensions provided by the workplace
have found themselves dependent on their children in retirement. Rural parents do not have
pensions and have to completely rely on their children for their old age. Children may
become the maj or source of some parents' financial support. During the social and economic
reform, planned economy is being replaced by a marketing economy and the old job security
system is replaced by competition. All these changes have led to wealth and a dramatic
improvement in living conditions and at the same time brought about uncertainty and
instability in an individual and family's life. As a result, Chinese families as a life-boat have
become even more important than ever for family members. With One-Child Per Family
Policy, Chinese parents and grandparents become only-child centered. Unlike industrial
countries China relies on families rather than a sophisticated social security system to care
for the elderly, and values collectivism more than individualism. It does not have a governing
system based on Western democratic ideology. Therefore, the transformations of Chinese
families during the social and economic development may have unique patterns and
trajectories. The current paper critically analyzes the studies of Chinese families over the
past 30 years to understand the changes in family relationship, values and structure since the
rapid economic development started. Three questions are asked: 1) Has Chinese family
become nuclear in structure and diverse in form? 2) Have Chinese shifted their values from
family collective interests to individual interests? 3) Has Chinese marriage declined in
importance?
Has Chinese Family Become Nuclear in Structure and Diverse in Form?
Xiaotong Fei, the founding father of sociology and anthropology in China pointed out a
misconception about Chinese family size and structure. On average a Chinese family in the
past did not have a dozen or more but 4-6 people; nor did it have five generations living under
the same roof as fictions or movies portrayed (Fei, 1981, 1982). The results from other
studies consistently supported his [mdings (Yuan, 1991; Wang, 2002; Wang, 2003; Luan,
2006). China has conducted six population censuses since 1950. The data show that the
average size ofa family household was 4.33 in 1953,4.43 in 1964,4.41 in 1982,3.36 in
1990, 3.44 in 2000 and 3.10 in 20 10 ("China Census Data", 1982; NBSC, 2011). In addition,
the 1982, 1990 and 2000 censuses revealed the nuclear family was the dominant family
structure (nearly 70%). Contrary to the belief that Chinese families are big, small families
accounted for up to 80% of the total household when single-person household was included
(Zeng & Wang, 2004; Wang, 2006a). Can we predict that with industrialization and
urbanization, China will follow the same path of industrialized countries in Europe and
North America? Namely, families will become nuclear, small in size and diverse in structure,
and that individual interests will precede family or collective interests.
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It is too early to conclude that Chinese families will transform in the same way although the
survey data show more than two-thirds of Chinese families are nuclear families and
individual interests are more recognized today than ever in the past. The development and
transformation of Chinese families will take a path and forms influenced by unique social,
economic and cultural factors and their interactions. Hareven (2001) once said, "To me, the
most important cross-cultural comparison is that the phenomena of social change that appear
similar on the surface are not necessarily the same underneath. Grand social changes are
mediated through local cultures" (p.35). This paper examines data related to family structure
and relationship from a Chinese social, political and cultural context.

There is a discrepancy between census data and actual living arrangements suggested by the
datafrom large scale randomly sampled surveys.

China Census data do not reflect actual family living arrangements. Instead Chinese census
collects data according to Hukou, a registration system of Chinese residency. For a long
period of time, Hokou served as a tool for the government to control population mobility and
allocation offood as well as other public benefits. Since the economic reform, this residency
control has been loosened up and people are able to move to a place where they can find a job
and prefer to live. Urban residency gives Chinese families privileges in housing,
employment, health care, and retirement than rural residency. Types and size of the family in
residency registration can be associated with different amounts of the benefits. Families may
keep the residency registry in a way that maximizes their possible benefits. This means, for
example, a person may live in a household or a family may live in a place different from the
place in their official registration. Large scale survey studies that used random samples
found that this discrepancy was reported by 50% ofthe participants in Shanghai (Xu, 1995a),
45.7% in Fuzhou and 57.2% in Xiamen (Jiang, 2002). More recently over one in four
Shanghai permanent residents (27.4%) and 20-25% of Beijing permanent residents did not
live in the placelhousehold where they registered for residency (Chi, 2011; Qiao, 2008;
Shanghai Bureau of Statistics, 2011). These numbers did not count farmer workers and their
families who migrated to big cities for jobs and a better life. One-third of Beijing population
is "temporary" or "migrant." The gap between the registration and actual living
arrangements is believed to be even higher among domestic migrant workers.
That one family owns multiple apartments is another factor contributing to the higher
percentage of small families revealed by recent census data. The economic reform has
brought wealth to many families and allowed them to afford buying apartments. Before the
housing reform, urban residents rented an apartment from their employer or from the city for
a token rent. The apartment was small. Housing was always tight due to the large population.
Since then, housing has been privatized as a part ofthe economic reform. Now families can
buy and own apartments. Families with means are able to buy multiple units for improved
living conditions and for investment. Besides it is a Chinese custom that the groom's parents
provide housing to the newly wed. Today parents in the rural area build a house for their son
and those in cities buy an apartment. Most young couples own a housing unit whether or not
the young couple will live separately from their parents after the wedding. Each unit is
registered under one person's name as a family in residency record. Therefore, the number of
families goes up and the average family size goes down while the total population (total
number of people) remains the same. The census data reflect the records of residency
registration whereas large scale surveys gathered the data of actual living arrangements of
the families. The actual size of households in which family member function may not be
small or nuclear as it appears in census records.
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The extendedfamily is the dominant family in which a Chinese family takes care ofthe young
and the old, and the family completes its fullfamily life cycle despite that the nuclearfamily is
the most common form.
Family is the smallest social entity around which living activities are collectively organized
for an individual member's physical and financial well-being (Fei, 1982) and more
importantly for hislher emotional well-being in Chinese society. Dramatic changes have
taken place in Chinese economic system and social structure in the last 30 years. However
family structure has relatively unchanged. The 2006 China General Social Survey (Li &
Bian, 2006) shows that over two-thirds of the families are nuclear families and one-third of
them are extended families (See Table 1). The Chinese extended family takes various forms:
the three-generation household, the two-generation household with one generation of
married siblings, and the grandparent-headed household with parent absent, e.g., children of
migrant farmer workers. Some Chinese scholars argue that the extended family is the basic
Chinese family structure even if only one-third of the families are reported as an extended
family (Ma, 1986; Guo, 1989, 1995; Shen, Li, & Zhao, 2009). Such an argument may be
understood from three cultural perspectives: 1) The number of extended families is not
shrinking with industrialization and urbanization; 2) The extended family fulfills the
complete tasks throughout the family life cycle, providing the care for the young children
and aging parents; and 3) Chinese nuclear families are unique in that many are not
completely independent but anchored within an extended family network, and have constant
physical interactions and emotional and financial exchanges with other kinship members,
i.e., parent and parent-in-law families.
1) The number of extended families is not shrinking but shows the sign of growing in the
process ofindustrialization and urbanization. According to modernization family theory, as
the level of industrialization rises in a society, there are fewer extended families and more
nuclear families. In the more recent 2011 China General Social Survey (CGSS, 2011) \ when
asked "Whom do you like most to live with after you are 60 years old?" only 26.8% Chinese
respondents would like to live with their children. However, the data show that extended
families grew gradually from 26.6% in big cities in 1982 to 34.3% nationwide in 2006 (See
Table 1). A separate survey in 2007 showed that the percentage was higher in farming areas
(43.3%) than in cities (30.7%). Even in the Shanghai area, the most industrialized region in
China, extended families were 29% of the total families with 27% in cities and 47% in the
countryside (CGSS, 2011). Today the generation of the only child who was born after the
implementation of One Child Family Policy has reached the age of marriage. Studies have
found that in urban areas two-thirds of married couples of the only children live with their
parents (Feng, 2006) and in rural areas four out offive married couples of the only children
live with their parents (F eng, 2010; Wang, 2012). Future studies should examine if lowered
fertility rate and increased number ofthe only child contribute to edging up of the number of
extended families.
2) The extended family provides the care for young children and aging parents throughout
the family life cycle. The roles and functions of family members in Chinese culture are
different from those in the Western culture during the family life cycle. For example, many
Chinese parents believe that they are obligated to take care of their grandchildren while their
sons or daughters are at work. Many young parents are also feeling more comfortable to
leave their only child to their parents than leave them at a daycare center. At the same time,
adult children are obligated to take care of their aging parents. Young couples may own an
1

cass, 2011 was conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Sociology.
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Table 1
Overview of the Chinese Family Structure from the Large Scale Surveys in
1982,1993-94,1993,2006 and 2007.
Family (CGSS)
5-City
family National Survey. Survey
10 Seven
Study
Project
Cities
1982

Single-person family
Nuclear Family
Conjugal Couples only
Couples with children
Single-parent with children
Extended Family
Stem Family
Multi-generations
United family
Others
Total
N
Mean number of persons in
one household

1993-1994

1993

2006

Family Survey
in Four Areas
2007

Large
Cities

Urban
areas

Rural
areas

Large
Cities

Nation

2.4
68.8

2.4
74.1
5.1
65.6
1.0
24.1
22.8
0.5
0.8
1.8
100.0
9334

1.8
68.8
12.1
54.3
0.6
31.7
25.3
2.2
2.2
2.2
100.0
5616

3.4
63.9
21.2
35.4
3.9
34.3
27.3
3.2
3.8
1.8
100.0
3208

5.1
68.8
15.9
47.7

2.9
55.7
11.7
41.1

2.3
4.6
100.0
4385

3.4
74.3
8.4
61.2
1.3
23.0
19.5
1.2
2.3
2.7
100.0
3577

30.7
27.2
1.1
1.3
1.5
100.0
3432

43.3
39.2
0.1
4.0
0.9
100.0
1640

4.08

3.78

4.29

3.59

5.09

3.25

66.4
26.6
24.3

Urban Rural
areas areas

Note: "-" = NIA
Data SourceyFive-City Family Study Project Group (1985). Chinese Urban Families. Beijing: Shandong People's
Press. Shen, C. L., Chen, Y. Y., & Gao, Y. (Eds.)(2000). The Third Survey ofthe Societal State of100 counties and/or
Cities, Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press. Shen, C. L., & Yang, S. H. (Eds.) (I 995).Contemporary Chinese Urban
Family Studies. Beijing: China Social Science Press. Shen, C. L., Li, D. S., & Zhao, F. (2009). Urban and Rural
Families in Transition. Chongqing: Chongqing University Press.

apartment and live separately from their parents after their wedding. They often move back
to their parents as soon as their child was born. It has also become common that young
couples drop their child at their parents' place before work and come back to their parents' for
dinner after work, and then go home with their child at night. In the latter case, the family
operates as an extended family in spite of the young couple living in a different apartment.
Both parents and young couples choose to enjoy some privacy as well as time together,
sharing resources and taking care of each other.
Chinese family development may be different throughout the family life cycle. Although
Chinese individuals go through the same life stages from birth to death, a Chinese family
may be viewed to begin and end with an extended family. For example, American aging
parents take pride in not becoming a burden to their children. The parent-headed stem family
ends when both parents decease. Unless Chinese children have a job in another area, they
live with parents and possibly grandparents in an extended family until they marry. The
newly wed may continue to live with or live separately from their parents now that many
Chinese families can afford buying a new apartment. The new couple is a "branch"/a part of
the extended family (Shen, Li, & Zhao, 2009) even if they live in a separate apartment. Most
young couples choose to live close to their parents. Upon the arrival oftheir child, they either
move back with their parents or ask their parents to live with them ifthe young couple lives
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and works in a different part of the co~ntry. With their child growing up, the couple may not
need as much assistance from their parents and may live independently. If any parent is sick
or dying, adult couples live with their parents again and become major caregivers. At this
time the parent-headed step family shifts to adult-child headed step family. Chinese aging
parents take pride in having children who take a good care of them (filial piety). Most
Chinese elderly dies in an extended family. During the different stages of the family life
cycle, Chinese couples and their parents live interchangeably in a joint or separate
household, depending upon the needs for the caring of family members. Relationship
between households within the kinship network is dynamic and interactive (Bian & Logan,
2001; Pan & Lin, 1987; Xu, 1995b). The change from nuclear to extended family is fluid and
somewhat elusive.
The young and the old are more likely to live in extended families in China. Studies of both
rural and urban have provided empirical evidence for such a cultural phenomenon. In
Shanghai, 57.9% survey respondents live in extended families (Xu, 2001). Seventy-five
percent of married couples and 85% of the only-child couples in rural Jiangsu and Sichuan
provinces reported living with their parents (Feng, 2010). The Longitudinal Chinese Family
Study (CPPS, 2010) shows 40% of married couples under ages of 40 in cities were living
with their parents at the time of the survey (Xu, 2013). Other studies show that 40-50% of
Chinese of ages 60 and above lived with their children in an extended family (Logan &
Brian, 1999; Whyte, 2005). Wang (2012) surveyed rural and urban families in seven
provinces and found a higher percentage, 53% urban and 67% rural parents over 65 reported
living with their children. The follow two figures illustrate the changes in percentages of the
extended families throughout the family life cycle (See Figure 2 and Figure 3). The older the
people were and the poorer their health is, the more likely they lived with their children.
Widows or widowers were more likely to live with their children (Logan, Bian, & Bian,
1998; Logan & Bian, 1999). With industrialization, job market has become competitive and
pace at work has become demanding. Young couples need child care support from parents in
order to stay competitive. Cutting living expenses by living with parents and sharing
fmancial resources is essential to Chinese young couples with less earning (Xu, 2013).

3) Chinese nuclear families are unique in that they are anchored within the extendedfamily
network, and have constant physical interactions and emotional alld/illancial exchanges
with extended family members. Cultural and social contexts may explain the uniqueness of
Chinese nuclear families. Firstly, in China, most women remain employed after becoming a
mother. Young working parents need childcare and afterschool care while they are at work.
Quality care is not sufficiently available in urban areas and even less available in rural areas.
Quality childcare is also very expensive. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, it is customary that
grandparents take care of grandchildren. Working parents would rely on their own parents
for childcare to save the childcare cost. Thirdly, having only one child heightens parents'
concern about child safety. Young parents of the only child may feel more at ease to know
their child is in the care ofthe family.
Chinese population is aging. The care for the elderly is not institutionalized in China and
most elderly live with their adult children, not in nursing homes (Xia, Wang, & Qin, 20 13).If
both husband and wife are the only-child, the couple may find themselves taking care offour
aging parents at the same time. Many young and old couples choose to live in separate
apartments but close to each other to benefit the convenience and mutual care (Long & Feng,
2007; Shen, 2013). Daily living activities are organized within an extended family. Many
nuclear families are engaged in its daily activities such as cooking, eating, cleaning, picking
up kids from school, or taking the sick to hospital, etc. Such a nuclear family also has its own
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Figure 1
The Divorce Rates Across Nations from 1980 to 2011(%)
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Figure 2.
Percentages of Children (only-child) Living in Extended Families at Different Ages
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space and maintains some level of independence. Therefore a Chinese nuclear family is an
essential part of an extended family network within which the nuclear family members
constantly interact and share resources with other members of the extended family (Pan &
Lin, 1987; Xu, 1995b). Most Chinese nuclear families are not a nuclear cell completely
independent of their parental families (Ma, Shi, Li, Wang, & Tang, 2011). Within this
extended family network monetary and nonmonetary resources are shared frequently.
Contemporary F amity Structure is Fluid and Dynamic

In classical family studies, family structure has been understood as a fixed characteristic.
That is, different family structures are exclusive to each other. For example, a nuclear family
is grown out of the parental family. There is a clear boundary of each family. Life tasks are
organized independently around two families. When an adult child's family has to move back
to parental home temporarily, it is not considered "normal," and eventually children will be
on their own feet. However, it is common that contemporary Chinese families organize their
living arrangements to fulfill family functions. Family development is not linear throughout
the family life cycle. A nuclear family that is spun off the parent family may join it again later.
In the new extended family, the head of the household can be adult children or their parents.
What is unique in Chinese families is that in reality, there can be two heads of the household,
both adult children or young couple and their parents or older couple. There appear to be a
quiet "re-shaping" of the family or family system accompanying the social and economic
reform in China. The process of reorganizations ofthe family is fluid and dynamic. As such,
they are able to meet the needs of individual family members and balance between family
and increasingly demanding work.
In the two-headed household, young and older couples while living under the same roof, they
mayor may not share living expenses, i.e., food and utilities, or each maintains separate
finances or budgets, but only share the space, spend time together and care for each other.
Another common arrangement is that young and older couples may stay in separate
apartments, but join during the day and contribute to living costs while keeping other
finances apart. China General Social Survey (CGSS, 20 II) found that over 50% of the twoheaded household families shared the dwelling but maintained their own finances.
The two-headed family does not fit the description of any conventional family form and
structure. It is a new living arrangement that contemporary Chinese families have created to
meet the needs of the family under the new circumstance during rapid socio-economic
development. Such a family structure not only makes it possible for family members to be
close and interdependent but also allows for autonomy and independence of an individual
family member. It is an innovation of Chinese families to balance traditional and modem
values, and adapt to the rapid changes in the social, economic and cultural context (Xu,
200 I). Over time Chinese one-headed household family becomes two-headed household
family with either one head/couple joining the other, the two-headed family may split again
into two independent one-head household families, and these two sometimes rejoin again.
The transformations back and forth are based on the needs and tasks of the two families at
any stage of the family life cycle.
Below is one typical family'S story to illustrate the complexity, fluidity and dynamics of
reshaping. A young couple with a 2-year old child was very busy with their jobs. Parents and
parents-in-law took turns to babysit during the day. Husband's parents lived close and came
to the young couple's apartment 4 days a week. They took care of the toddler and cook, and
usually went back to their own apartment after dinner. If they couldn't come because tof
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illness, wife's mother would fill in three days a week or whenever she was needed. The
maternal grandmother stayed with her daughter and son-in-law while she was taking care of
her grandchild. On weekends when the young couple was not busy, they would care for their
own child. Sometimes either set ofgrandparents took their grandchild to their own apartment
for a few days. Whenever the child was sick, wife's mother would stay in her son-in-Iaw's
parents' place to provide care for both the sick child and the paternal great grandmother who
could not live independently. The constant shifts ofliving arrangements are child-centered.
In residence registry, they may appear to be three independent families, a young couple with
a child, an older couple with an aging mother, and another older couple. They functioned as
one extended family or extended family network to meet the needs. The family boundaries
are not rigid, rather temporary and transitional. They share living resources, but maintain
separate family finances. Such living arrangements and family forms are seen evetywhere
(Shen, 2013). Child-centered, fluidity and diversity are the marked characteristics of
Chinese families during the social transition.
Diverse Farms afFamilies Emerge and Take Small Percentages ofthe Population
In accompany of rapid urbanization and industrialization, a dramatic improvement in living
conditions has taken place. Some families having benefited from the reform become very
rich while others are disadvantaged and struggling. Children born after the implementation
of One Child Family Policy have reached marriage age. Different forms of Chinese families
have emerged. Although most Chinese live in nuclear or traditional extended families, an
increasing number of individuals live in single-parent families and single household
families, and live in emerging forms of Chinese families such as families with double income
and no kid (DINK), cohabitant household and two-headed household as mentioned earlier,
and other nontraditional families. In rural families, adult sons' families may take turns to care
for their aging parents. Parents live with one son's family for one or two months and move to
live with another son's family. When it is a son's turn to care for parents, his family is an
extended family during that period. When it is his brother's tum, his family becomes nuclear
family again and his brother's family becomes an extended family. Zhang (2009) and Wu
(2009) dubbed it as "care-in-tum family." Other family forms are also documented in the
literatures: An "nontraditional nuclear family" consists of a father working away from home
and a mother caring for their child with the help of relatives (Pan, 2006). A "temporary stem
family" (Yao, 2012) or "intergenerational nuclear family" (Kong, 2011) is a grandparentheaded household that consists of grandparents who live with and are caregivers of their
grandchildren. There are rural parents whose adult sons and daughters took jobs in cities and
left their children behind to the care of grandparents. In other words, the emerging forms of
families are the living arrangements chosen by Chinese in response to their own needs and
circumstances. The so-called family transformations in Modern China may just be family's
creative living organizations discussed by Strauss and Duby (1996) in the current social
economic context. The relationships that Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) described as
post-familial families, e.g., "without formal marriage or without children, single parenting,
conjugal succession, or same sex partnerships, part-time relationships and companionships"
(p.99) are still uncommon in China.
Have Chinese Shifted Their Values From Family Collectivism to Individualism?
Since the beginning of Chinese economic and social reform over 30 years ago, Chinese
family values and relationships have been influenced by the extensive changes in the human
ecological systems such as employment, housing, child-rearing, health care, elderly care and
education, etc. Chinese enjoy more freedom in mate selection and marital satisfaction.
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Meanwhile the divorce rate is increasing. Privatization of housing allows for greater
individual space and privacy. Increased mobility and booming economy provide
employment opportunities while jobs become more difficult to secure and work becomes
more stressful. Quality child care is more available while child-rearing and education
become more expensive. Young couples gain more independence in career development
while they need parents' support for child care in order to be successful. Consequently filial
piety is challenged by an increasing emphasis on individualism (Yan, 2006), especially
among the young generation of the only-child (Liu, 2011), but at the same time family
collectivism is needed and valued.
The increasing emphasis on individualism has caught researchers' attention. Studies show
that Chinese family members are struggling between their individual interest and collective
interest of the family (Shen, 2013). Career opportunities and living away from home
weakened family kinship tie. Chinese culture strengthens the tie through social function of a
family. In China, marriage is the union of two families, not two individuals (Pan, 2010).
Family stability is the foundation of stability and solidarity of the society, and has
implications for national security and prosperity (Meng, 2008). As such, Chinese laws hold
family members mutually obligated to each other. Chinese Marriage Law stipulates that
parents be obligated to provide care and education to their young children while adult
children bear the responsibility of caring for their aging parents. The Amendment to the Law
on Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Elderly (NPCPRC, 2012) further states that
family should attend the emotional needs of the elderly members. They should not be
ignored and neglected. If adult children live separately from their parents, they should visit
them regularly. Chinese culture tends to discourage or prevent divorce, cohabitation,
infidelity and failure to fulfill family responsibilities through social influence and control
(Cui, 2007; Pan, 2010). During the transitional period, the struggle between collectivism and
individualism will continue. It is too early to conclude that Chinese have become "me-first"
in the family.
Family Members are More Relying on Each Other to Overcome Life Challenges

Independence, freedom and individual right are the core concepts of individualism. A
nuclear family in Western culture is isolated with a clearly defmed boundary. According to
Parsons (1943), a nuclear family lives separately from and is fmancially independent of
parents. The nuclear family is also apart from other kinship members and rarely has
economic exchanges with them. Children in the Western families are socialized to be
independent at a very young age, for example, they have their own bedroom and sleep in a
separate bed. When grown up they choose their college and major for study, friends to be
with, whom to date and marry, and where to live. When getting married, they do not expect
parents to cover all the wedding expenses and to provide housing for the newly-wed. When
getting old, they do not expect to live with and be taken care of physically and financially by
their adult children. In contrast, Chinese children are raised to be socially sensitive to others.
Fei (1981) once said:
When a child begins to walk, he is surrounded by a net of people who will keep him on the
track or under control. ... What a child is criticized for in an hour must be more than what
an adult is criticized for in a year.
Growing up in Chinese culture, children are seldom involved in the decision associated with
their education. Parents tend to interfere with their children's choices of job, dating and
marriage. It is the norm that parents take care of everything, from the cost of college
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education to the payment of housing after marriage. On the other end, Children rely overly
on their parents financially. Unmarried adult children continue to live on their parents.
Married young couples expect the groom's parents to buy them an apartment. Children take
granted for parents' support. In exchange, aging parents expect adult children to attend to
their needs physically, financially and emotionally.
The exchange pattern of fmancial resources and mutual dependence is obvious in Chinese
rural families where parents do not have pension. They invest all their life savings and time in
their children by providing or building a house when they get married and child care after
they have children. Chinese Family Values Survey (CFVS, 2008) found three-quarters ofthe
parent participants said parents should be responsible for their children's college education.
The proportion is higher among rural parents of ages 50 and over. Only one-third disagreed
that parents should provide housing for their married sons. Among the respondents younger.
than 35 years old, 63% of married children lived in the housing units either owned or rented
by their parents of which, 85% were owned and only 15% were rented. More rural parents
(84%) than urban parents (51 %) provided children with housing. Rural parents could use up
all their life savings to build a house for the married son in expectation for being taken care of
by him and his wife when they need.
Families Prioritize Collective Interests Over Individual Interest
Filial piety has long been the core Chinese virtue. Close family relationship and
interdependence in modem era has been documented in literature. A survey study in Shanxi
and Fujian showed that majority of respondents in their 20s of all levels of education
attainment reported they would take responsibility and take care oftheir families including
parents and siblings. These young respondents would take their family and family input
seriously into consideration when choosing job, place to live and dating partner, and
financially supporting parents and siblings. They reported to assert their freedom and
individual right to choose their marital partners if parents and siblings interfered with their
choice. Family members were most likely to intervene with their decision about the marital
partner (Hansen & Pang, 2010).
Another study of white collar employees in Shanghai found that both parent-child
relationship and marital relationship were very important to them. There was a strong bond
between parents and their only child who was married (Shen, 2013). It may be that these
Chinese parents were willing to continue to contribute to their married children's life. Adult
children enjoyed that parents were reliable resources and at the same time they were grateful
and wanted to pay back. Filial piety was on the top of the 29 criteria for choosing marital
partner among Chinese of 20-30 years old (Li & Xu, 2004). Li (2011) noted cultural and
social factor might contribute to the strong bonding between parents and adult children.
Launching of a child was not viewed as an essential task of parents in Chinese culture.
Parents' overprotection of the only child delayed the "launching" of the child or the
"launching" never existed. The married children found it easier to fall back on their parents
when there was a financial or relational challenge. With a rapid increase in divorce rate, the
married only child might attach the equal importance to relationships with their parents and
spouse and might even see the kinship was more reliable than spouse relationship.
Chinese families of low income and in poverty need interdependence to survive. In China
today,job market is more competitive and life is more stressful than ever. New social warfare
system has not fully developed while the old system is gone. Government assistance is
limited. Monetary support, time and physical care from family members are critical to
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disadvantaged families with limited resources. Chinese families reported to receive most
support from parents, children, siblings and other relatives who provided care for young,
elder or ill members and financial relief to a member out of work within the extended family
(Gui & Zhang, 2003; Pan, 2006; Xu, 2007; Zhao, 2006). Although two-thirds of urban
residents disagreed that "caring for grandchildren is the responsibility of grandparents," only
a little over one-third of rural residents shared the same view (CFVS, 2008). During a stage
of the family life cycle, an individual has to rely on others in the family and is not able to be
completely independent, e.g., child care. Without enough savings, the current social security
or financial aid from the government are not sufficient for retirement. The additional support
for older people in cities and most living expenses of older people in rural areas come from
adult children and relatives. Families provide physical care for the elderly whether or not
they are urban or rural (Zhang, 2001). Therefore, mutual obligation and interdependence are
valued over individual interests by Chinese family.
Table 2
Percentages of Respondents' Choices on a 7-point scale on Attitude Towards
"Family Interests are More Important Than Individual Interests" of Different Age
Groups (%)
Age
20-35

36-50

51-65

20-35

36-50

51-65

I.Strongly disagree
0.3
2.
0.2
3.
7.1
4.Neither disagree nor agree
9.1
5.
39.9
6.
29.3
7. Strongly agree
14.0
Total
100.0
N
1009
M
5.32
SD
1.09
F

0.1
0.7
5.1
8.6
40.7
30.6
14.2
100.0
1046
5.38
1.05
0.85

0.3
0.7
4.9
10.6
39.0
31.9
12.6
100.0
960
5.33
1.06

0.9
3.7
8.7
19.1
34.5
19.6
13.5
100.0
1009
4.96
1.32

1.0
3.5
9.4
20.1
35.3
20.7
9.9
100.0
1048
4.87
1.28
1.38

0.7
3.2
7.5
22.4
32.7
22.4
11.0
100.0
960
4.95
1.26

Has Chinese Marriage Declined in Importance?
Classic modernization theory posits economic development and growth in wealth make a
society likely to embrace democracy. New modernization theory suggests that
modernization is also associated with cultural changes and postindustrial societies see an
increasing emphasis on self-expression and autonomy (Inglehart, & Welzel, 2009). In
accompany of economic reform and open-door policy following Mao's era, China amended
its 1950 Marriage Law and added no-fault divorce clause to the 1980 Marriage Law (Xia,
Wang, Do, & Qin, 2013). Chinese gross divorce rate (the number of divorces divided by the
population (in a thousand) has increased from 0.33%0 in 1979 to 2.29%0 in 2012 (Ministry of
Civil Affairs of P.R. China, 2013). Although it is rare, cohabitation is emerging. Living
together without being married has become an alternative living arrangement for couples
and has been accepted in industrialized countries. . Has Chinese marriage become less
important? The current section examines recent data from China Census for decades and
several large scale surveys in order to address this question.

43

The Changes in Mainland Chinese Families
Most Chinese Will get Married and the Age a/the First Marriage has Increased

Marriage has been viewed as an ideal path for life by Chinese men and women. The 1982
Chinese Census found that only 3% of men and 0.2% of women were never married (The
State Department Census Office, DSCO & National Bureau of Statistics Population
Division, NBSPD, 1985). Latest studies show the majority of Chinese view marriage is
important and is their primary choice. Seventy-seven percent ofthe respondents in a recent
survey reported man/woman should get married no matter what. Only less than 2%
responded "strongly disagree." Significant differences were not observed in gender but in
rural (81.2%) vs. urban (69.2%) areas (Xue, 2011). In another survey using random
sampling, 99% of participants regardless of age or gender chose "strongly agree" when
asked "A good/happy marriage is very important for your life," and nearly none reported
"disagree" (Xu, 2010).
In addition, most Chinese will enter matrimony at some point of their lives and the rate ofthe
unmarried has not increased in the past 30 years. The data of the Third Chinese Census in
1982 showed the unmarried men and women of the age of 15 years and above were 32.7%
and 24.2% respectively (DSCO & NBSPD, 1985). The Sixth Chinese Census in 2010
observed a lower rate of the unmarried population, 23.6% among men and 19.3% among
women. In the age groups of 30-34, only 12.6% men and 5.3% women were never married
and of 40-45, the rates dropped to 4.2% and .7% (See Table 3, NBSC, 2012). Only a small
fraction of Chinese population is never married and the rate has not gone up in the last three
decades.
Table 3

Percentages ofthe Unmarried Aged from 22 to 44 in 1982-2010 (%)
Age

1982

1990

2000

2010
Nation

Urban

Rural

Male
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
Female
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44

72.0
23.1
8.8
6.7
5.7

62.5
16.7
7.2
5.7
5.1

78.7
24.7
7.5
4.1
3.8

82.4
36.3
12.6
6.4
4.2

89.8
44.8
13.3
5.3
2.9

76.9
31.1
13.7
8.3
5.5

46.4
5.2
0.7
0.3
0.2

41.2
4.3
0.6
0.3
0.2

57.5
8.7
1.4
0.5
0.3

68.3
21.9
5.3
1.7
0.7

80.1
29.1
7.3
2.7
1.3

58.4
16.7
4.4
1.3
0.5

Note. The data from the unmarried aged 44 and beyond were not listed in the table. For 2010, the data from small
towns were not listed. All the data were from the third, fourth, fifth and sixth national population survey.

As shown in the table above, the age of first marriage is getting older. Of the age 20-24, the
unmarried accounted for 72% of the total Chinese population in 1982, 62.5% in 1990 and
78.7% in 2000 and 82.4% in 2010; the rate was higher in the urban areas than in the rural
areas. The average age offrrst marriage in cities was 25.5 in men and 23.9 in women in 1980,
dropped to 24.4 and 22.8 respectively in 1990 and grew back up to 26.9 and 25.1 in 2010
(CNBS, 2012). A similar pattern was observed in rural areas. The average age of the first
marriage was 24.4 for men and 22.3 for women in 1980, dropped to 23.2 and 21.6
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respectively in 1990 and increased again to 24.8 and 22.8 in 2010 (NBSC, 2012). Overall the
age increase for Chinese first marriage is slow and moderate. Compared to other developed
countries, Chinese still get married at a younger age. According to The United Nations
Population Statistics Yearbook 2010, the first marriage age is about 30 years in many
countries and regions, e.g., 29 in Japan, Mongolia, Latvia, Czech and Albania, 30 in
Australia, Finland, Belgium, Hungary, Holland and Italy, and 31 in Denmark, Ireland, Nepal,
Germany and Slovenia, and 32 in France and Sweden.
Research of the residents in Shanghai about their views on marriage showed younger
generation tended to have a more open attitude towards marriage and favor a broader
definition of marriage. In 2004, 48.2% of Shanghai women aged 20-30 believed it was an
individual choice whether or not to be married (Xu, 2004). A recent survey showed a little
over than half (51.7%) of Shanghai women reported favoring a broader definition and the
percentage was higher among younger and urban women (See Table 4) (Shanghai Women
Federation, 2010). This percentage is much lower than those reported by women in other
countries, e.g., 56.9% in the U.S., 98.2% in Britain, 81.6% in Germany, 82% in Sweden, 84%
in Japan and 85.1 % in South Korea (Japanese Government Equal Opportunity Office for
Men and Women, 2003). Given that Shanghai is the most urbanized region in China, this
percentage can be expected to be lower in rural areas and nationwide.
Table 4
Percentages (%) of "Marriage is a personal choice, and it does not matter whether
married or unmarried" (Shanghai)
Nation

Residency

Age

Urban

Rural

20-30

31---40

6.7

5.6

14.1

5.5

5.0

7.1

8.0

2.

31.2

29.5

43.4

24.3

34.7

28.5

34.5

3.

10.4

10.3

10.4

10.6

11.0

11.7

9.2

4.

35.4

37.0

24.2

36.6

36.2

34.0

35.0

5. strongly agree

16.3

17.5

8.0

23.0

13.0

18.6

13.3

Cumulative %

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

N

2600

2272

328

548

516

494

1042

M

3.24

3.31

2.68

3.47

3.18

3.29

3.11

SD

1.24

1.22

1.21

1.24

1.19

1.25

1.24

l.strongly disagree

F

76.702***

41-50 51-64

10.826****

Note. The data were from the Third Survey Study of Shanghai Women Social Status (2010). It was conducted by
Shanghai Women Federation.

Pre-Marital Sex has Become More Acceptable but Cohabitation Remains Marginalized

For thousands of years, Chinese feudalist society adamantly demanded a woman to remain a
virgin before her marriage and held virginity to be the first and primary virtue of women. It
continued to be the moral standard for young women and men after the socialist era began in
1949. Premarital sex, especially resulted in pregnancy could lead to severe negative
consequences such as stigma, social isolation, losing face of the individual and the family,
and even disciplinary actions by employers. Premarital sex was viewed as immoral and dirty.
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Among the couples who were married before the economic reform, only 2% reported
retrospectively they had premarital sex. Among those who married between 1987 and 1996,
13% reported they had premarital sex while 30% never kissed and 45% never hugged each
other (Xu, 1997). On one hand, surveyed couples could underreport their intimate behavior
prior to marriage for fear of losing face and on the other hand, this could be an example of
strong influence of abstinence culture.
The strict cultural emphasis on abstinence loosened when China began to implement family
planning and birth control in early 1980s. Sex education became a part of reproductive health
education and made sex less a taboo. In 1989,68.7% of the participants in a random sampled
survey reported people should have no premarital sex, even if they were engaged (Li, 2003).
By contrast, only 26.9% of respondents considered premarital sex wrong in a large scale
survey nearly two decades later (Chinese Family Values Survey, CFVS, 2008). The
percentage dropped to 13.5% among the people of ages 35 and younger. In addition, 42.2%
of the respondents showed an acceptable attitude towards cohabitation among older single
people. Meanwhile premarital sex and cohabitation increased in China. One in four reported
having had premarital sex or cohabitation in the 18-35 age group and there was no significant
difference between rural and urban respondents (Li & Bian, 2006) (See Table 5).
Table 5

The Percentages of Differences on Pre-marital Sex and/or Cohabitation Between
Urban Areas and Rural Areas (%)
Age

Education

18-35

36-50

51-70

Elementary and
below

Middle/
high
school

College
and
above

Sum

Urban

24.5

10.7

6.3

6.2

13.2

21.1

12.6

Rural

23.8

6.1

5.4

6.2

16.1

15.0

10.9

Total

24.1

8.1

5.8

6.2

14.8

20.4

11.6

N

777

1029

1055

1173

1523

167

2861

Data source: Chinese General Social Survey, CGSS2006. The data were from the Sub-project of Families ofCGSS
2006.

Chinese adolescent dating was strictly forbidden by both families and schools in the past.
Today parents and schools still highly discourage adolescents to date, believing this can
distract them from focusing on their education and preparation for the competitive college
entrance exam. However their attitude and measures taken against it may have loosened up.
A survey of 1,593 Chinese adolescents of ages 14-17 found that 50.4% of boys and 34.9% of
girls dated before, and 13.5% boys and 13.8% of girls reported having a dating partner at the
time of the survey. The percentages of the adolescent respondents had experiences of
kissing, caressing, and intercourse are approximately 38%, 26% and 15% for boys, and 20%,
17% and II % for girls (Huang & Pan, 2012). A majority (65.4%) did not believe ''the more
adolescents know about sex, the more they would engage themselves in sex that may lead to
pregnancy." On the contrary, they agreed that sex education help prevent sexually
transmitted diseases and teenage pregnancy (CFVS, 2008).
Despite that premarital sex and cohabitation become more acceptable and are not used as
criteria for judging an individual's moral character, values and beliefs about sex and marriage
are deeply rooted in the Chinese culture for thousands of years and remain influential on
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people's sexual behavior. Dating partners are careful and try to protect themselves and their
families from losing face. In addition, Chinese family laws do not protect the rights of
couples in cohabitation and children born to unmarried couples do not have the same rights
and benefits in health care, child care and education as other children do, hence also
influencing the people's attitude and behavior. Chinese Family Values Survey (CFVS 2008)
reported only 11 % of the participants believed that premarital sex was absolutely normal and
77% felt less secure in cohabitation than in marriage. Surveys repeatedly found only 1% of
the total survey respondents and 3-5% of younger respondents in cohabitation. Thus, the
percentage of Chinese couples in cohabitation will still be small and marginalized in China.
It will be long time before cohabitation, premarital sex and birth, and same sex marriage are
recognized by law in China (Li, 2006). There will still be stigma and prejudice against single
household family, childless marriage, and single parent family (Mao, 1996; Xia, 2004; Xu &
Zhang, 2003).

Divorce Rate is Growing Higher While a Marriage 'Jor better and jor worse till death" is
Still an Ideal Union That Many Couples Continue to Pursue
Over the last 60 years China has seen several peaks of divorce (Xia, Wang, Do, & Qin, 2013).
The first peak occurred soon after the current government took office in 1949 when the first
Chinese Marriage Law in 1950 stipulated that people should be free to choose their marital
partner and be equal within marital relationship. The second jump followed the Amendment
to the Marriage Law in 1980 when No-Fault divorce clause was added. However, Chinese
culture emphasizes the interests of the family and the country over the interests of an
individual. Marriage stability has been viewed as critical to maintaining the financial and
political stability ofthe nation. Individuals seeking divorce could be seen to be selfish and a
flaw or the deteriorating of moral character. An increase in divorce rate was viewed as a
serious risk fornational security. Between 1950 and 1980, most marital conflicts and divorce
were intervened and mediated informally by the couple's families and friends, and formally
by their employers and neighborhood associations. For example, a divorcee's promotion
might be called in question because he or she was viewed as lack of moral character or
problem solving skills. During this period, it was very difficult for couples to seek the
dissolution ofa marriage in court.
With the ending of Mao's era followed by China's Economic Reform in late 1970s, external
influences from employers and neighborhood associations, and the government tight control
over the marriage were loosened up. Stigma associated with divorce was weakened.
Emotional well-being became more important after the Economic Reform brought wealth
that allowed many families to enjoy improved living conditions. Chinese couples began to
pay attention to the quality oftheir marital relationship. Meanwhile getting divorce became
less difficult when No-Fault Divorce was added to the Marriage Law. Chinese gross divorce
rate has been growing over the last 30 years. It was 0.33%0 in 1979,0.69%0 in 1990,0.960/00 in
2000 and 2.00%0 in 2010, and 2.290/00 in 2012 (Ministry of Civil Affairs of P.R. China, 2012).
However, the number of divorced individuals of ages 15 and above is not high in China due
to a high remarriage rate. The 2010 Chinese Census Data (NBSC, 2012) showed the
percentages of divorced individuals in the total popUlation of ages 15 and above were 1.5%
for men and 1.2 for women. Between the ages of 35 and 54, the rates were higher, 2.5% for
men and 4.9% for women respectively. The rate was lower among residents in rural areas,
0.4% for men and 2.6% for women (See Table 6).
Compared with other countries, China continues to have a low gross divorce rate. China was
ranked 58 lh among the 86 countries with data in 1998 and 58 lh among 84 countries in 2006.
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Table 6
The Gross Divorce Rates (ratio of divorced population to the total population)
Nationwide and by Gender and Residency of ages 15 and above (%)
Nation
Age

15+
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40--44
45--49
50-54
55-59
60-64
64+

Urban area

Small town
(zhen)

Rural

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

1.5
0.0
0.2
1.0
2.1
2.5
2.6
2.5
2.3
1.6

1.2
0.0
0.2
0.9
1.7
2.1
2.1
2.1
1.8
1.2
0.8
0.5

1.8
0.0
0.0
0.5
'1.6
2.5
3.2
3.8
3.7
2.6
1.7
0.9

2.2
0.0
0.1
0.7
2.1
3.5
4.3
4.9
4.2
2.8
1.7
0.8

1.4
0.0
0.2
1.0
2.1
2.4
2.4
2.2
1.9
1.4

1.2
0.0
0.2
0.9
1.8
2.2
2.1
2.0

1.4
0.0
0.3
1.4
2.4
2.6
2.3
1.9
1.6

0.6
0.0
0.3
1.0

1.3

0.8

1.1

0.8

1.5

1.0
0.7
0.5

1.3
1.1

0.8

Note. The data were from China Census 2010.

Figure 3.
Percentages of Children (non only-child) Living in Extended Families
at Different Ages.
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The standing for China barely changed because the divorce rates of others were moving up
during the same period when the divorce rate was increasing in China (See Figure 1).
The gross divorce rate counts the number of divorces in general population including
children, the never married and the widowed, thus a less accurate measure of divorce rate. An
alternative measure is refined crude divorce rate that counts the number of divorces in a
thousand of married couples. Based on census data, the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, NBSC (1985) estimated, Chinese crude divorce was 2%0 in 1982, namely, one
divorce in every 500 married couples. In 2000, the rate increased to 3.6%0 and 7%0 in 20 I O.
Chinese marriage is stable in spite of the increase in divorce rate. China General Social
Survey Li and Bian (2006) found that 83.6% of respondents rated their marriage satisfactory
or highly satisfactory. When asked if you could choose again, would you choose the same
person as your spouse, 45% responded absolutely and 43% responded most likely whereas
3.9% said absolutely not. When asked if Chinese law should make it more difficult to get
divorce, less difficult or no change, over one-third liked it to be more difficult though the
majority thought it should be no change. These results are consistent with findings from the
Chinese Family Values Survey (CFVS, 2008). The CFVS found that when asked how often
they think of divorce, 93% of respondents reported never, 4.3% rarely, 1.7% sometimes, and
only 0.9% often. Over three-quarters (87%) of the respondents agreed they would try their
best to keep the marriage whereas only 7.1 % disagreed. The same survey also found that
about 28% of participants disagreed or strongly disagreed while 52% of participants agreed
or strongly agreed that a person's happiness would be preferred over an unhappy marriage,
indicating a growing interest in individual well-being. Individuals with higher education
attainment and residing in urban areas reported a higher interest than those with less
education and residing in rural areas. Approximately one-fourth agreed that children would
be better off if their parents separated or divorced than stayed together, fighting all the time
whereas two-thirds disagreed.
The statistics above indicate that a traditional belief is no longer popular. That "Marry a
chicken, live with a chicken for life; marry a dog, live with a dog for life" is an old saying that
Chinese are taught to follow for thousands of years. Chinese divorce rate is on the rise.
However, marriage does not crumple. Chinese people are committed to long-term marital
relationship. Most Chinese couples are concerned about the negative impact of divorce on
children. They would keep their marriage for the sake of children.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION
Changes in family structure, values and relationship have occurred in accompany of rapid
social and economic development over the past 30 years. Before the reform, the old systems,
i.e., communes in the countryside and state owned faculties in cities guaranteed life
necessities at the minimum level but left individuals and families no mobility and no choices.
The changes in housing, education and job market have brought opportunities, choices and
wealth, and at the same time posed many challenges and stress to Chinese families during the
social transition. They seek support and relieffrom their marriage and family. These changes
have strengthened the utility of intergenerational relationships. Family collectivism and
mutual dependence are preferred over individualism and continue to be the dominating
family values.
Empirical evidence shows most Chinese families are no longer controlled by "zuzhang, " the
chief of a large extended family. There are more nuclear families than any other forms of
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families in "modern" China. Extended families do not seem to shrink, but also prove to be
highly functional in addressing the needs of family members. Extended families play a
critical role during the stages of child rearing and death and dying in the family life cycle.
China is yet to develop a new system of public support now that the benefits from the old
systems are dropped. Struggling families are left with limited resources and turn to their
extended families. Physical, fmancial and emotional supports from extended family network
become their most reliable resources in performing family life tasks and in coping with stress
and challenges. The extended family is a network of mutual obligations and benefits. As
such, Chinese family structure is "extended" in nature whether a family member is in a single
household, nuclear family household, extended family household or other forms of living
arrangements. Chinese families are different from western families in the transitional period
in that mutual responsibilities still come before individual growth. Chinese nuclear families
enjoy a close relationship with extended family members. The instability resulted from the
social and economic transition does not weaken marriage and family, but forces them to be
highly functional in modern China.
Contemporary Chinese families take various forms, "temporary extended family,"
"grandparent-headed nuclear family," "single parent family," "single household family,"
and "two household head family." The new forms of families have not become the major
family organizations and they may continue to evolve. Such diversity suggests that
modernization of family in China take on Chinese social, economic and cultural flavors.
Namely, family changes are influenced by not only by thousands of years of history and
culture, but also by policies and reform implemented after the Mao's ear, and the interactions
among all these influences. Family transformation does not occur in a linear, staged process
as predicted by Western modernization theory. Chinese families are marked by multiple
formations, temporary organization, and fluid and dynamic transformation.
Existing studies have not examined how economic reform and development affect Chinese
women's role and status in the family and women's self-expression. In the past 60 years, both
before and after the economic reform, China has been implementing two different economic
systems and different housing, health care and welfare policies in rural and urban areas.
Little research has documented the differences in structure, function and relationship of rural
and urban families in the process ofmodernization.
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